I. INTRODUCTION

I
N THE last decade, the smart grid has been emerging as the next-generation electrical power infrastructure. It integrates information and communication technologies, intelligent control policies, renewable energies, and complex energy systems. However, the promising economic benefits from the smart grid are accompanied by rising cyber-physical security challenges [1] , [2] . On one hand, the conventional physical structure of power grids (as shown in Fig. 1 ) is lack of critical protection against cyber-penetrations [3] , [4] . On the other hand, the cyber-integration exposes unprecedented risk of unauthorized access and attack threats to power grid operation [5] . Understanding the power grid vulnerability beyond normal operational conditions and disturbances has already become a critical task for the smart grid. Security studies have investigated potential attack schemes and countermeasures. Such attacks exploit different aspects of vulnerability in the smart grid: malicious data attacks [6] inject undetectable false data into the state estimation to mislead grid operations. Line-switching interdiction [7] extends traditional line contingency into interactive attacker-defender scenarios. Cascaded attacks [8] evaluate the risk of cascading outages triggered by attacking a small set of components. Time synchronization attacks [9] target at the critical temporal information of measurement and devices. These attack scheme studies aided traditional power grid contingency and stability analysis by revealing security concerns that are usually outside the scope of normal operating dynamics, random faults, and major disturbances due to extreme natural events.
Smart grid attacks are not limited to a single target when cyber-security are considered: it should be assumed that attackers have the ability to compromise multiple measurements or manipulate control commands from the cyber-space [10] . In addition, despite the standardized N − 1 security and the forthcoming N − 1 − 1 and N − 2 security standards, it is important for both forensic and security studies to understand the N − k vulnerability of smart grids under potential smart and informed attacks. It remains to date a complex task to thoroughly examine the grid vulnerability under multiple coordinated attacks.
Multi-contingency screenings in power systems have mostly focused on concurrence [11] - [13] instead of sequence.
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However, recent studies on the sequential attack have revealed another vulnerability in the smart grid [14] - [16] . Instead of a straightforward concurrent attack scheme, sequential attacks can be launched on critical components consecutively. It is similar to the extension of N − 1 − 1 contingency, but the number, target, and timing of attacks could be determined by the attackers to could lead to a maximized damage. A preliminary study [14] has shown that sequential attacks with the same strength can cause comparable damages as the concurrent attacks; nonetheless, sequential attacks require less concurrent resources to coordinate, and the vulnerability of the same targets in such attacks can differ significantly: some line outages that occur back-to-back can lead to much severe system blackouts than when they occur at the same time.
To identify most critical sequences that can lead to largescale system failures, existing sequential attack and contingency studies rely either on heuristic graph methods [15] , exhaustive search [16] , or engineering expertise [17] . A more systematic and effective method can be helpful when bulk power systems are considered. False data injection attacks [18] could also lead to topology attacks [19] , though the current studies still focus on concurrent schemes and are mostly detection-oriented [20] , i.e., to probe concurrent attack schemes that are undetectable by current mechanisms. Instead, this study focuses on impacts of sequential topology attacks with consideration of physical system behaviors when attack has bypassed the detection, as it is equally important to investigate the attack schemes based on its impacts on the physical system to fully understand its threat.
The development of machine learning algorithms provides promising tools to handle complicated security problems with a large, stochastic search space. The patterns underlying in the system dynamics and cascading failures can be adaptively revealed by computational intelligence algorithms. The adaptability, i.e, the ability to self-tune based on previous experience can also aid the vulnerability analysis of a complex system. This paper introduces a novel Q-learning based approach to adaptively identify the more vulnerable attack sequence that can cause critical system failure from sequential topology attacks. In what follows, the term "sequential attack" (SA) exclusively refers to the sequential line-switching interdiction on the power transmission grids.
The major contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) The paper proposed a reinforcement learning based approach for vulnerability analysis of sequential attacks in power transmission grids. The approach evaluates the blackout damage resulting from line-switching interdiction with consideration of overloading-related cascading outages and hidden line failures. It formulates the problem under the reinforcement learning framework and identifies critical sequences in sequential attacks with the Q-learning algorithm; 2) The proposed method, utilizing the Q-learning algorithm and Monte Carlo simulation, effectively identified grid vulnerability under sequential attacks causing complex system outages. Simulation-based case studies showed that critical attack sequences that lead to large blackouts have been identified. Results with different systems and loading levels have shown the effectiveness of the proposed method as it discovers more vulnerable target sequence in sequential attacks; 3) Only topological information has been used to identify the critical attack sequences with the Q-learning approach; this echos the vulnerability observed in [21] as complete information of system dynamics is not required to identify critical sequences in the power grid. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the topology attacks on smart grid, the sequential attacks, the cascading outage vulnerability, and the platform to simulate system responses and outages after line-switching attacks. Section III describes the proposed Q-learning approach to identify critical attack sequences. Section IV demonstrates the simulation results on three benchmark systems of different scales and under different loading. Finally, Section V provides the conclusions and future works.
II. SEQUENTIAL TOPOLOGY ATTACKS IN SMART GRIDS
A. Topology Attacks on Smart Grids
The smart grid integrates two-way communication into system planning and operations [22] , where the control centers rely on the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems to monitor and operate the grid. However, the entire infrastructure, as illustrated in Fig. 2 , has been shown vulnerable to both cybernetic and physical penetrations [4] , [23] . Among different threat models, the topology attacks can create large blackouts by manipulating the grid connectivity and creating large disturbances in interconnected power systems [19] .
The attack surface consists of both commands and measurements in the smart grids. First, code attacks can manipulate or forge control commands [24] , [25] to maliciously close a target line from distance [26] , [27] . Advanced schemes using tools like the Petri-net [28] can also launch coordinated cyber-physical attacks on transmission components such as transformers and circuit breakers, and maximize their damage when sufficient resources and/or complete information of power systems are available.
Alternatively, the measurements, consisting of status and analog data collected from remote terminal unites (RTUs), are also targets of interest in cyber-attacks. Status data are topological measurements describing the connectivity of the grid, a vital piece of information to determine transmission capability and system reliability. Analog data consist of measurements of system states, including voltage, frequency, active and reactive load, among others, which are vital details of system dynamics. Both data are measured and transmitted to the control room for operational decision making. In this process, topology data attacks can be launched directly by manipulating the status data [30] or indirectly by misleading system operation with false analog data [18] , [31] . For either type of attacks, there may also be unforeseen, zero-day type of vulnerabilities to be exploited by smart grid attackers [4] .
B. Sequential Topology Attacks
Aforementioned manipulation of control commands or interdiction of controlled electronic devices can pose severe threats to electrical power transmission [32] - [34] as the budgets against interdiction are often limited [25] , [35] .
In this paper, a sequential attack is defined as a series of coordinated interdiction with malicious topological attacks in a power transmission grid. Specifically, this paper refines an interdiction to the line-switching attack, i.e., the malicious operation that turns an in-service line to out-of-service. Each line-switching directly changes the topology of a transmission grid [36] , [37] ; in practice, these attacks can be launched from manipulated control commands, false line status data, or physical sabotages. They can also be disguised as irrelevant disturbances or contingencies that are harder to defend [17] . Fig. 3 illustrates the state transitions of power systems in blackouts and the phase where a sequential attack kicks in to trigger a cascading outage, with reference blackout stages described in [29] .
Mathematically, a sequential attack scheme can be formulated as a sequence S of ordered and timed 2-tuples [15] :
where (a i , t i ) describes the i -th line-switching attack launched on target line a i at time t i ; k is the number of attacks in the sequence and N is the number of active lines in the power grid. By definition, the time-domain sequence T = {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t k } is non-negative and monotonically non-decreasing for any
The inclusion of selection, ordering and timing in (1) poses a complicated task for vulnerability analysis of sequential attack schemes [16] . The target selection needs to be made from a total of N k combinations; ordering of the combinations expands the problem to a permutative space N! (N−k)! ; in addition, the timing introduces a continuous variable in time domain, where there is little research to provide a background truth or a systematic approach to the best knowledge of the authors. Particularly, attacks with arbitrary timing during transient states with fast system dynamics will lead to complicated and nondeterministic system responses. Therefore, this paper focuses on the handling of the first two aspects in the vulnerability analysis under different sequential attack sequence A; the influence of sequential attack timing T is yet to be analyzed in the future work of this paper.
Consequently, three assumptions are made in this paper to further refine the definition of sequential attacks:
Assumption 1: Attackers can access and manipulate the topological information of power systems. The topological information refers to the connectivity of substations and transmission lines, recorded in the status data and changeable by circuit breaker operations or malicious manipulations as shown in Fig. 2 .
Assumption 2: Each line-switching attack a i ∈ A is launched during a steady-state of the system, which includes both normal and emergent operating points in Fig. 3 . This decomposes a sequential topology attack into a series of k consecutive individual line-switching attacks on a power grid, allowing this study to focus on the identification of attack sequence in vulnerability analysis.
Assumption 3: Without loss of generality, the cost to attack any line is considered equal in this paper.
With the assumptions above, the attack objective is to identify a minimal attack sequence that causes a critical system failure through cascading outages. The critical system failure occurs when the number of line outages exceeds a critical threshold N θ that leads to a system collapse and/or major blackouts, shown as the point of no return in Fig. 3 .
C. Vulnerability of Cascading Outages in Power Systems
Cascading outages are among the most severe threats to power grid stability [29] , [38] . A malicious attack can trigger cascading outages with various mechanisms, including line overloading [39] , frequency and voltage instability [40] , grid islanding, among others. Although the initial attack can be few compared to the scale of a power grid, cascading outages often lead to severe and costly power blackouts and economic losses [41] . This vulnerability can thus be targeted and exploited by attacks who aim at triggering cascading outages [42] , where the targets can be buses (substations) [21] , lines [43] , or combined [25] .
Modern power system security studies have brought forth many cascading outage models [38] . In general, the triggering and propagation of wide-spread line outages can be modeled as a stochastic process considering overloading and hidden failures [44] . After the initial attack, lines suffering severe or prolonged overloading are exposed to more risks of outage. Based on these considerations, a dedicated simulation platform has been developed in this paper. The platform is adopted from a dedicated cascading failure simulator (CFS) based on direct current (DC) power flow model [15] , [39] . Under the steadystate assumption, the DC model is a linear approximation [39] that can describe the power system cascading outages within a short time period. The DC-CFS assumes that the bus voltages have a uniform magnitude of 1.0 p.u., the transmission lines are lossless, and the voltage angle is small enough so that the angular difference θ satisfies sin( θ ) = θ . For the load profile, to prioritize load demand and minimize load shedding, the re-dispatch policy will rely on generation adjustments and only apply load shedding as the last resort. The load demand between re-dispatches is considered constant according to the steady state assumption. The hidden failure in cascading outages [45] , which considers random outages of exposed lines, has also been integrated in the simulator. The entire procedure is briefly described below and the pseudo code is provided in the Appendix. Interested readers may refer to [11] , [15] , and [39] for further information regarding the model. 1) Topology update: The simulator updates the grid topology when a line is attacked or tripped; 2) Power re-dispatching: With the topology updated, the generation and load in the grid are re-dispatched. The generators are first ramped up if there is a power deficit or ramped down if there is a power surplus. Then, additional generations are tripped in an ascending order to protect the machines if a power surplus persists after the ramping. Last, if a deficit persists after the ramping and tripping of generation, the load demand will be shed in an ascending order to avoid further instability and collapse of the system; 3) Power flow update: After the re-dispatch, the simulator recalculates power flow along each transmission line based on the DC power flow model [46] ; 4) Overload monitoring: The simulator monitors the lines in the grid and marks a line as overloaded if the line flow F l exceeds its thermal rating limit C l ; 5) Line outage risk: The simulator checks the overload extent F l − C l and duration τ of overloaded lines and computes the accumulated risk O(l) for line l over time [11] :
6) Overload protection: An overloaded line is tripped if the accumulated overloading risk O(l) exceeds a pre-given critical threshold O T . 7) Hidden failure risk: Trip exposed line with the hidden failure probability. Considering the degree and duration of persisting line overloading, the hidden failure probability is defined as a function of the overloading risk O(l) and critical overloading threshold O T for exposed lines. In this paper, the hidden failure probability is defined as:
The above process is repeated until no line is overloaded and no target remains to be attacked. Note that this procedure is a simulation of power system behaviors resulting from attacks. The attacker will only be able to observe and manipulate the line status as discussed in Sect. II-A. Meanwhile, any line outages simulated by the CFS depend on dynamics of the system that are affected by but unknown to the attacker.
III. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF SEQUENTIAL ATTACKS WITH Q-LEARNING
A. The Q-Learning Algorithm
Q-learning belongs to a category of semi-supervised learning algorithms [47] known as the reinforcement learning (RL). In general, RL seeks an action sequence that produces the maximal cumulative rewards via a trial-and-error manner. A typical framework of reinforcement learning is shown in Fig. 4 [47] . An agent takes a sequence of actions at a series of states before it reaches an ultimate goal. The quality of each action is assessed by an evaluative feedback from an environment, known as the "reward". By adaptively adjust its actions, the agent has an ultimate objective to learn an optimal policy from the cumulative rewards to maximize the expected total rewards it will receive from the environment.
In general, the expected total rewards Q is computed by a discounted cumulative function of the reward r t observed upon the action a t taken at state s t :
where γ is a discounted factor. Setting γ = 1 weights every immediate reward equally in the sequence of actions. In practice, γ is commonly set slightly smaller than 1.0 to facilitate the convergence of Q value during the learning process [47] . Although the true optimal value of Q * is usually unknown in practice, it can be approximated by the Q-learning algorithm iteratively. The Q-learning is an off-policy, temporal difference reinforcement learning algorithm that approximates the optimal Q value with Monte Carlo simulation [48] . The general procedure of the algorithm is described below:
In Q-learning, a Q value is assigned to each state-action pair (s, a). Each triplet of Q, s and a creates an entry in a Q-table. Initially, all the Q values are set to zero.
Then, when a state s t is observed at time t, the agent first searches for a set of available actions A t . The optimal action a * t at s t is determined by:
where A t is the set of available actions at s t . If multiple a * t exists, a random tie-breaker will be chosen as the a * t . Note that (5) favors the maximum of total rewards Q instead of an immediate reward r t to achieve the long-term optimality.
In search for the policy towards the optimal total rewards, random experiments are run repeatedly to update the Q value, during which the quality of the action sequence is improved towards the optimum:
where α is the learning rate that controls the aggressiveness of learning. Empirically [47] , setting α = 1 will make the agent extremely aggressive, focusing on the immediate reward r t +1 received and the estimated approximate total future rewards max a Q(s t +1 , a). This can lose the knowledge learned from previous experiments and cause unnecessary oscillations. On the contrary, setting α = 0 will make the agent extremely conservative, as it sticks to its initial estimate and learns nothing from its actions. In practice, the value is often chosen as a trade-off between aggressiveness and conservativeness. The updated Q value for the given state-action pair is saved in the Q-table for future decision-making process. It is possible that the agent makes non-optimal actions at the beginning of training when it tries to learn from the feedback of rewards. Eventually, the algorithm will converge to the optimal action sequence that collects the maximal total rewards [48] .
1) Exploitation vs. Exploration:
It is notable that Q-learning could be sensitive to deteriorate initialization and local optima problems. This can cost more learning time in practice. Therefore, exploration is commonly used in reinforcement learning. This paper utilizes the optimistic initial guess and the -greedy method for the exploration purpose.
The optimistic initial guess overcomes deteriorate initialization of Q-learning. It initializes the Q values of all valid actions of any state s 0 encountered for the first time to be a positive constant, e.g., +1, so that the agent is first encouraged to explore different actions and later adjust the Q value estimates towards the actual long term rewards.
The -greedy method is used to address the local optima problem during the learning process. Specifically, when the agent queries an action a t from the Q table for the current state s t , the -greedy method forces the agent to take a nonoptimal valid action, i.e., any action other than a * in Eqn. (5), with a small probability . Numerically, this means that the probability that the agent takes the optimal action is given by:
where a * t is the optimal action at s t according to (5) . A proper choice of can balance the trade-off between exploitation and exploration so that the algorithm converges to the optimal policy in an effective and efficient manner. To avoid excessive exploration after the agent has learned much from the trials, the exploration parameter can starts from a larger initial value 0 then linearly decreases with a certain step distance δ to a near-zero value f , after which it remains constant. This allows the agent to sufficiently explore the searching space and then fine-tunes the Q value in a timely manner during the learning process.
B. Vulnerability Analysis With Q-Learning
The paradigm of Q-learning applies well to the vulnerability analysis of sequential attacks in the smart grid, as shown Fig. 4 . First, an attacker, who seeks to identify the more vulnerable components in the power grid in sequential attacks, is considered as the agent in Q-learning. Next, the electrical power grid can be viewed as an independently operating environment that responds to the malicious actions of attackers. The action of the attacker is the malicious line-switching and the states can be defined by parameters of the system. Finally, the goal of attack is to produce a critical system failure where a fatal fraction of lines are out of service. The learning objective of the attacker is to find the optimal policy that reaches this goal with the least number of lines attacked. The pseudo code of the vulnerability analysis is shown in Table I , and the design of the state s t , the action a t , and the reward r t are given as follows.
According to Assumption 1, a state is exclusively defined with the system topology as only the topological information is assumed available to a potential attacker. According to Assumption 2, a state also exclusively refers to the steadystate prior to sequential attacks. The initial state is s = 1; the intermediate states s t are post-attack states after any cascading outages triggered by previous attacks. A complete system failure occurs when s = 0 and a critical failure occurs when the number of non-zero elements in s is dangerously low for a system. It is notable that a number of transitional states could exist between two consecutive attacks if there is a series of cascading outages. To evaluate the quality of sequential attack action, these transitional states are not considered as individual states during the Q-learning but only as intermediate transitions between s t and s t +1 .
First, the topological system state s t is defined as a vector of line status s t = {s t (1), s t (2) , . . . , s t (N)}, where:
Second, an action is defined as the line-switching attack as in (1) . An attack a i on line l switches the status of l from in-service to out-of-service. The corresponding value in s t is set to zero. Finally, the evaluative feedback, or the reward r , is a critical variable in reinforcement learning. Given the aforementioned attack objective to create a critical system failure, this paper proposes the following reward function:
where N o is the total number of lines outages used to define the blackout size. N θ is the critical threshold at the pointof-no-return (the attack objective), and k is the number of attacks launched sequentially. A sequential attack scheme is successful if it achieves the objective with an amplification effect (r = +1), i.e., the entire scheme causes N θ or more line outages with less than N θ actions. Otherwise, it is either unsuccessful if it takes k = N θ attacks to achieve the objective blackout size (r = −1) or neutral if the number of attacks and line outages are both still under N θ (r = 0). In the last case, the sequential attack will be continued until the objective blackout size is reached.
IV. SIMULATIONS
A. Simulation Setup
The performance of the proposed Q-learning based vulnerability analysis is tested on three benchmarks: a small-size IEEE 5-bus test system [49] , a mid-sized IEEE 24-bus reliability test system (RTS-79) [50] , and a large-scale IEEE 300-bus system [51] . Parameters of the three test systems are provided in Table II and the one-line diagrams for the 5-bus and RTS-79 are shown in Fig. 5 . Different systems will have different critical levels when cascading outages lead to a system collapse. We defined the blackout size as the combined number of line outages caused by the direct line-switching attack and the cascading failures triggered by the direct attacks. For the smaller IEEE 5-bus benchmark, we consider the attack objective to be a complete system failure, i.e., θ = 100% and N θ = 6; for the midsized IEEE RTS-79 system and the large-scale IEEE 300-bus system, we consider more realistic attack objective of a critical system failure, where after a fatal number of lines are taken out the system will lose its functionality. Subsequently, we consider θ = 20% (N θ = 8) for the RTS-79 system and θ = 2.5% (N θ = 11) for the 300-bus system.
The Monte Carlo simulations are used to address the randomness from the stochastic hidden line failures [45] in the proposed vulnerability analysis. As a common practice in the validation of power systems security analysis, repeated simulations on typical operating points help verify the effectiveness of the method. Specifically, a set of 100 independent simulations is first performed on each of the three benchmark systems. Every experiment consists of up to 1,000 trials, during which the Q-learning agent seeks attack target sequences to reach the critical blackout size N θ as the attack objective. At the beginning of the first trial in each experiment, the initial Q values are set to +1.0 and the same for any new state-action pairs onward, which is an "optimistic" estimate to encourage exploration during the early stages. In each subsequent trials, the initial state is reset to the attack-free state with no line outages, while the Q values learned from previous trials are retained.
We start each experiment with a relatively large exploration probability of 0 = 0.3 and decrease it to a small final value of f = 0.005, with a step-down by = −0.005 after each trial. Meanwhile, following the common practice of Q-learning, we choose α = 0.1 for a less aggressive learning process and γ = 0.9 to slightly weight more on the recent reinforcements [47] . 
B. Attack Performance Evaluation Under Typical Operating Points
We first evaluates the performance on the IEEE 5-bus test system, for which the performance saturated after about 200 trials. Fig. 6 shows Q values of the action taken in each attack and the number of line outages afterwards. In Fig. 6 , we first observed that the initialized Q value for t = 1 was quickly decreased from +1.0 to near-zero after 10 trials, showing that these early trials were mostly unsuccessful. Because of this cold start effect, these early trials from 100 experiments were also close to random search. This sharp decrease suggested that random or exhaustive search would be ineffective in identifying the vulnerable attack sequence. Meanwhile, after the initial trails, the Q-learning started to explore successful attack sequences and update the Q values quickly, reflecting the expected total reward learned from its trials. After about 100 trials, the Q values were stably increased to different ranges of expected total rewards for different rounds of attack in the sequence.
In addition to the estimated Q values, the number of line outages (the blackout size) is also shown in Fig. 6 . As a comparison, the number of line outages caused by random attacks have also been plotted as unmarked dash-lines with the corresponding colors for different values of t. Except for the first attack (t = 1), the average blackout size after each attack in the sequence was increased during the Q-learning process, as shown in Table III . The improvement was most significant for the second attack (t = 2), with an increase Note that the system is N − 1 secured so that there is only one line outage after the first attack, but the corresponding Q value is about 0.66, indicating the expected total line outages in the future. On the contrary, the random attacks did not utilize any knowledge from previous trials and thus failed to identify more vulnerable sequences over time. These results on the 5-bus system have exhibited the effectiveness of the Q-learning based vulnerability analysis, learning from trials to reach the objective blackout size with purely topological information. Fig. 7 shows the performance on the IEEE RTS-79 system. Similar to the 5-bus system, we also observed similar changes of Q value for the first to the third attack in the sequence in Fig. 7 , with respective expected total rewards from the attack. Meanwhile, with the Q-learning, as shown in Fig. 7 , the blackout size was improved from 2.06 to 5.15 after the second attack (t = 2) and from 3.15 to 8.39 after the third attack (t = 3), respectively. Although the RTS-79 system is N − 1 secured, with the attack objective set as N θ = 8, it only took three sequential attacks to cause a critical 8-line blackout after 500 trials with Q-learning. In contrast, random attacks (unmarked dash-lines) did not show any improvement over time. The largest line outages achieved by random attacks was trivial compared to the Q-learning approach. With the same level of solely topological information, the proposed Q-learning based scheme was more effective in finding critical attack sequence on the RTS-79 system.
With the two case studies above, the proposed approach is further validated on a large-scale benchmark, the IEEE 300-bus system. The results are shown in Fig. 8 . Similarly, the Q values converged through the learning process (Fig. 8) and the reinforcement improved the blackout sizes from the second attacks towards the attack objective, an 11-line outage, after 598 trials (Fig. 8) on average. Some oscillations persisted after 700 trials, as the final blackout size differed slightly due to cascading outages and hidden failures when the objective was achieved. The results validated that the proposed approach is scalable to bulk power systems.
The attack cost can also be evaluated by the average number of attacks required to achieve the objective blackout size, as shown in Fig. 9 . The dashed lines indicate the respective objective blackout sizes, which are the unsuccessful (worst) Fig. 9 .
Number of attacks taken to achieve the objective blackout size (dashed line) for the IEEE 5-bus, RTS-79, and 300-bus systems. The numbers reduced by the Q-learning exhibited the effectiveness of Q-learning in identifying more vulnerable attack sequences.
case for the attackers as they would need to attack as many lines as possible to achieve the attack objective. According to Fig. 9 , the initial number of attacks required to reach the objective blackout sizes are 5.48, 7.29, and 10.14 for the 5-bus, the RTS-79, and the 300-bus systems, respectively. These numbers were reduced to 4.67 for the 5-bus system after 100 trials, 2.82 for the RTS-79 system after 500 trials, and 3.16 for the 300-bus system after 700 trials, respectively. Afterwards, their values remained in respective stable ranges, and the eventual numbers of sequential attacks launched to reach the attack objectives were 4.60, 2.85, and 3.09, respectively, for the three systems. From the simulations, the Q-learning based scheme also effectively reduced the number of attacks through the learning process.
C. Attack Performance With Varying Operating Points
As the load of power systems fluctuates with time, the robustness of the proposed approach shall be tested under different operating points (OP). Assuming a benchmark system's total default load is 100%, we solved the optimal power flow to obtain an OP with a peak load at 120% and another with a reduced load at 80%. Simulations were repeated on the three benchmark systems and the eventual blackout size when the attack objectives were achieved are shown in Table IV with different loading settings.
From the simulation, the proposed Q-learning based approach has successfully identified critical sequential topology attacks with respective objectives on all three benchmarks with different loading levels. In general, lowering loading levels reduced the system stress and make them more resilient to cascading outages and sequential topology attacks. In contrast, the peak loads turn N −1 secured systems (under default loading) more stressed and vulnerable. The blackout sizes resulting from the proposed Q-learning based vulnerability analysis are consistent with the statement above. As load increases, sequential attacks caused more line outages with the same number of attacks and attack objective were achieved faster.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has presented a novel Q-learning based vulnerability analysis of electrical power grid in the sequential topological attacks. By monitoring topology change in the system, the Q-learning based sequential scheme was able to find out vulnerable sequences that led to critical blackouts in the system. Not only did the scheme increase the number of line outages through the learning process, but it also reduced the number of attacks launched by excluding unsuccessful attack sequences that did not take advantage of the cascading outage vulnerability. Simulation results on the IEEE 5-bus, RTS-79, and IEEE 300-bus systems have demonstrated the learning ability and the effectiveness of the proposed approach. From the perspective of a grid defender/operator, the Q-learning based vulnerability analysis can identify critical components in a potential sequential attack scheme. It also gives a warning sign that topological status information of the system could be utilized to conceive disastrous attack schemes. These insights will be helpful in improving situation awareness of the smart grid against cyber-attacks.
The future work will develop detection and mitigation strategies against sequential attacks. While the proposed approach utilizes reinforcement learning to screen potential vulnerable sequences of topological line-switching, it is not limited to the DC power flow model or the hidden failure model and adaptions can be made to consider other factors such as voltage and frequency for vulnerability analysis. Meanwhile, it is valuable to extend the manipulatable information to more sources and parameters to identify if they may result in more catastrophic attack impacts on the critical power infrastructure. Finally, the online learning ability can also be added to refine the learned vulnerabilities in real-world applications.
APPENDIX THE CASCADING FAILURE SIMULATOR
